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A Note on Informality in the Labor Market
* 
 
This paper provides a detailed analysis of various dimensions of informality in the Mexican 
labor market. To understand the nature of informality in terms of regulations and compliance, 
the legalistic view, and in terms of productivity view of the labor market this paper makes an 
empirical contribution to the debate in the literature on the concept of informality. Questions 
related to these various concepts, social security and benefits coverage, contractual 
information, legal status of migrants, the nature of self-employment and job history 
information are analyzed in terms of their relationship to each other and are also related to 
individual and household characteristics. This paper finds a substantial overlap between the 
various concepts, current legal arrangements of social security coverage or contract and also 
in the individual’s job history. In terms of individual characteristics age, education, martial 
status and scores in the Raven’s test, an ability measure, are significant determinants for the 
various forms of informality, with some degree of variation across the different categories. 
Overall, a case is made for further studies of household survey data and the implementation 
of questions relating to different dimensions of informality and their inter-linkages. 
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* I have benefited from the discussions with Ira Gang and Ravi Kanbur on the concept of informality. 
I thank Zahra Siddique for her comments. All errors are my own. 1. Introduction 
“Individuals are not informal; their actions and activities are. Nor do those who operate 
informally comprise a precise or static sector of society; they live within a gray area 
which has a long frontier with the legal world and in which individuals take refuge when 
the cost of obeying the law outweighs the benefit. Only rarely does informality mean 
breaking all the laws; most individuals disobey specific legal provisions […].” 
Hernando de Soto. 1989. The Other Path. I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, London. p. 12 
 
To address the question of ‘informality’ the existing literature has come up with various 
definitions and concepts. De Soto (1989) in his above quote emphasizes that there is no 
distinct border between formality and informality in the legal sense. Sometime one can 
find compliance to one regulation and non-compliance to another but as such there is no 
clear distinction between formality and informality according to a single concept. The 
“frontier” of informality and formality is extensive (De Soto 1989). In this respect it is 
necessary to determine what particular form of informality and what particular form of 
formality is present in the labor market under study (Fields 2009; Kanbur 2009). This has 
wider implications for labor market studies, which analyze the labor market and the 
nature of informality. The debate in the literature has centered around the question 
whether informal and formal labor markets are segmented or integrated. In the traditional 
view, based on the Harris-Todaro model, informal and formal labor markets are 
segmented. Informal workers are ‘involuntary’ in the informal labor market and barriers 
to entry prevent them to move in the formal labor market. Contrary to this, it has been 
argued that ‘voluntary’ choice of informal workers and self-employed also characterizes 
the informal labor market (Maloney 1999, 2004). Here, the two labor markets are not 
segmented but integrated. A third view proposed by Fields (1990) combines these two 
seemingly mutually exclusive views: the informal sector is seen as very heterogeneous 
and two-tier. Some informal sector participants are there involuntary and segmented from 
the formal labor market while others work voluntary in the informal sector.  
To test the presence of segmentation, integration or a heterogeneous two-tier informal 
sector suggested by Fields (1990), empirical evidence generally tries to assess (1) the 
existence of a wage gap and/or (2) job mobility between the formal and informal 
  2segments.
1 The majority of empirical evidence has so far been conducted in the developed 
country or Latin American context, partly due to data restrictions. However, some recent 
studies have looked at other developing countries in Africa and some transition 
economies.  
Methodological differences in these empirical studies exist on several dimensions: 
definition of informality in the labor market, estimation strategies employed to address 
the econometric problems and the data sources to study these phenomena. The main 
differences among these studies are the following: 
Definition of informality usually falls within the boundaries of the so-called productivity 
or legalistic definition in the labor market, depending on the data available. Data 
employed in the studies are usually national household survey data sets with individual 
observations. Cross-section and panel data, which are rarer in the developing country 
context, are exploited in the different studies.
2 Estimation strategies of most of these 
studies have tried to address the econometric problems of selection on observables and 
unobservables, identification and endogeneity.
3 The evidence corroborated by these 
studies so far gives a very mixed picture and lends credence to all three labor market 
paradigms (segmentation, integration and two-tier informal sector), depending on the 
country and time period under study. However, the definition of informality and the data 
available also provide a constraint in terms of analysis of the labor market and policy. The 
particular definition of informality and data availability make some of these studies and 
their conclusions about labor market segmentation or integration non-comparable and 
non-generalizable across countries or across time within one country. As Kanbur (2009) 
                                                 
1 The existence of a wage gap between the formal and informal sector is usually taken as evidence of 
segmentation in the labor market. However, it has been argued that without an alternative model of an 
integrated or competitive labor market, this evidence could be misleading (Magnac 1991; Galiani and 
Weinschelbaum 2006). Job mobility, depending on the circumstances, could also be an indication of both 
segmentation and integration (e.g. job movement into the informal sector after an economic crisis could 
point at a segmented labor market while general job mobility could indicate no segmentation between the 
sectors).  
2 In some studies an explicit questions regarding the social security contribution or employment registration 
of the individual would allow a more precise coding of the legalistic definition (e.g. in the Brazilian case the 
question on whether the worker has a “card”/employment contract registration or not.). Recent surveys in 
Colombia and Bulgaria conducted by the World Bank included extensive questions on the social security 
system (Peracchi, Perotti and Scarpetta 2007; Perrotti 2008).  Also supplementary questionnaires on 
informality, which were attached to national surveys, in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia and Dominican 
Republic provide further information on social security and productivity measures of informality (World 
Bank 2007).  
3 The estimation strategies ranged from difference-in-difference estimation, propensity score matching, 
Heckman selection correction type estimation, treatment effects models, instrumental variable estimation, 
regression switching models, Markov processes to more descriptive methods and simpler regression 
models, depending on the data availability and question of interest of the study.  
  3argues the context of each particular study and the definition of informality, relative to a 
specific regulation, is also important for policy analysis. As he argues “policy analysis 
can also be affected, since very disparate situations are all given the same label, of 
‘informality’, with a related tendency to apply the same policy instrument to very 
different situations” (Kanbur 2009, p.6).  
Given the importance of understanding the nature of informality, this paper attempts to 
shed some light on the different concepts of informality and uses a data source to examine 
these empirically. This will give further insight for the applicability of certain policies to 
these contexts.  
By no means is this paper an extensive review of the literature on all the different 
informality concepts in the literature. On the contrary, the attempt is made to understand a 
few distinct notions relating to informality, such as the productivity definition and the 
legalistic definition and to understand which regulation and degree of compliance to it is 
in place. In particular, I apply a novel data set on Mexico, which contains many questions 
relating to various dimensions of informality. This makes it possible to understand these 
concepts and their relationship to each other. Given the breadth of the dataset, it is 
possible to analyze various dimensions of informality relating to social security, 
contractual arrangements, migration, job history and different employment relationships 
such as self-employment in small firms. This has not been covered to this extent in the 
existing empirical literature on informality.
4 The intention of this paper is to study the 
different informality measures, which are key starting points in empirical studies of labor 
market segmentation and integration as well as policy evaluation and design.
5 Moreover, 
an attempt is made to understand the correlations of these different informality measures 
and also their determinants in terms of individual and household characteristics.  
In the next section the main concepts on informality in the labor market are summarized 
and discussed. Then the Mexican data set is discussed and the various measures of 
informality estimated from this data set are introduced. Descriptive statistics for the 
various measures are discussed. The correlation between two legalistic measures, social 
security coverage and contractual arrangements, for 2005 and also for 2003 are then 
analyzed. Also the determinants, in terms of individual and household characteristics, of 
                                                 
4  The closest paper to this by Henley, Arabsheibani and Carneiro (2006) investigates informality in the 
Brazilian labor market. However, my paper looks at further dimensions of individual labor market 
informality such as migration and job history and thereby exploits the panel structure. 
5As Fields (2009) argued, it is important to understand what measure of informality is in the studies at hand. 
He proposed instead of talking about “formality” versus “informality” that the actual dividing criteria 
should be used, such as “covered” versus “uncovered”. 
  4these particular forms of informality are estimated. Finally, this paper concludes with a 
discussion of the main results and their implications.  
 
2. Informality in the Labor Market 
The definition of informality and the informal sector poses a challenge in itself due to its 
very nature of not being easily observable (Schneider and Enste 2000; Mead and 
Morrisson 1996). A very broad definition defines the informal economy as including 
“unreported income from the production of legal goods and services, either from 
monetary or barter transactions, hence all economic activities that would generally be 
taxable were they reported to the tax authorities” (Schneider and Enste 2000, pp.78-79).
6  
As this paper is concerned about the functioning of formal and informal labor markets in 
developing and transition economies, my analysis restricts itself to the labor market and 
income generating activities as workers or the self-employed.
7 Even with this restricted 
view informality in the labor market is difficult to pin down and can be characterized 
according to several dimensions, depending on data availability, the legal system present 
and nature of the labor market and occupations.  
The  productivity definition and  legalistic definition of informality are the two most 
commonly employed in the labor market literature (World Bank 2007): 
(1) The productivity definition characterizes informality in the labor market by job 
characteristics. The informal segment of the labor market under this definition constitutes 
non-professionals, unskilled, marginal jobs, the self-employed, domestic and family 
workers and workers in small firms with up to 5 employees (Hussmans 2004). 
(2) The legalistic definition characterizes informality in the labor market by the non-
compliance to the state in terms of labor laws and social security systems (Saavedra and 
Chong 1999). The informal segment of the labor market under this definition is 
characterized by workers and the self-employed non-compliant or without access to the 
social security system or pension system.
8  
                                                 
6 This definition excludes unpaid activities such as home production, which does not generate income, or 
illicit activities such as drug smuggling. A distinction between licit, illicit, legal and illegal is made in the 
economic sociology literature definition of informality (Portes and Haller 2005; Portes and Schauffler 
1993).  
7 For a discussion of the evolution of the term of ‘informality’ and the different literatures see Kanbur 
(2009).  
8 In many countries waged workers and their employers are mandated to contribute to the social security 
system while for self-employed different rules and regulations exist and they often have to make their own 
pension arrangements and contributions.  
  5These two definitions of the informal labor market can, when looking at the data, overlap 
but still differ from each other and do not necessarily cover the same set of workers or 
self-employed in the informal sector (Gasparini and Tornarolli 2007; World Bank 2007). 
This indicates heterogeneity within the informal sector. In a recent study with Brazilian 
household data over the period 1992 to 2001, informality is analyzed using three different 
definitions of informality (employment contract registration, social security protection 
and the characteristics of the job) (Henley, Arabsheibani and Carneiro 2006). It is found 
that compositional changes and the likelihood of informality differ depending on the 
definition of informality. This is taking as growing heterogeneity of the informal sector 
over time (Henley, Arabsheibani and Carneiro 2006). 
Given the ambiguity in these different concepts, the heterogeneity of the informal sector 
and the ‘long frontier with the legal world’ as De Soto (1989) put it, Kanbur (2009) 
argues the following: 
“[…] every characterization of formality and informality needs to specify precisely the 
regulation concerned. Formality and informality are dichotomies relative only to specific 
interventions or regulations. This has two immediate implications. 
First, definitions based on other criteria, such as size, or capital intensity, or degree of 
organization, or nature of competition, etc., cannot be used (unless, of course, the 
criterion itself appears in the regulation). Second, generic definitions of informality are 
not to be used, or at least are to be treated with careful scrutiny as regards their usefulness 
in analytical and policy discourse.” (Kanbur 2009, p.6-7). Kanbur (2009) goes a step 
further and links formality and informality relative to specific interventions, regulations 
and the degree of compliance. In his view various sets of regulations such as minimum 
wage laws, social security provision, health and safety regulations and others across 
various sectors can be distinguished according to agents and their behavior and activities 
after the intervention (Kanbur 2009).
9  
To distinguish formality and informality with respect to regulation and the various 
possibilities of compliance, non-compliance, adjustment and non-adjustment implies a 
dynamic view of informality in some sense, before and after regulation. From the 
empirical point of view this provides an additional challenge as one would need 
information not only at one point in time but also over time for an individual in a given 
                                                 
9 He proposes four distinct possibilities, which then can distinguish formality and informality in some form 
(Kanbur 2009, p.7): “A. Stay within ambit of regulation and comply. B. Stay within the ambit of regulation 
but do not comply. C. Adjust activity to move out of ambit of regulation. D You are outside the ambit of 
regulation in the first place, so there is no need to adjust to it.” 
  6country. Also in the data set one would need to find information on various regulations 
and laws and the nature of compliance and non-compliance at various points in time and 
for the individual. Looking at these different measures will already provide an insight on 
the nature of informality with respect to a particular regulation, but it still leaves the 
question of enforcement open. The degree and intensity of enforcement, which according 
to Kanbur (2009) is crucial to understand the nature of informality, is most commonly not 
covered in the household level datasets and will not be easily uncovered.  
In this paper it will only be possible to disentangle some of these regulations and interpret 
them and their compliance in the particular context of Mexico, and also for illegal 
migration in the context of the U.S.. 
In addition to that this paper also looks at the productivity measure of small-scale self-
employment.   
 
3. The case of Mexico: Data and Measures 
3.1 Data
10
This paper employs a unique dataset on Mexico to understand informality in the labor 
market and its various dimensions better. The Mexican Family Life Survey (MXFLS 
from now on) was collected in 2002 and 2005 with the purpose of providing detailed 
information on various aspects of Mexican life over time and space. The intention is to 
develop a longitudinal database which covers rural and urban locations across Mexico. 
The MXFLS-2 for 2005, which I work with in this paper, contains information for 
approximately 40 thousand individuals. Detailed questions for households and 
individuals, even migrants, cover standard topics such as education, employment, health, 
crime, expectations and preferences, household and individual characteristics. In addition 
detailed questions on various relevant aspects of the labor market are included. Questions 
relating benefits, social security, contracts, legal status of migrants, firm size and other 
information such as payments of wages and incomes and participation in government 
programs are elicited, which this paper employs to understand the nature of informality in 
Mexico.  
3.2 Mexican Measures of Informality 
The MXFLS data allows us to determine various dimensions of informality in the 
Mexican labor market. The productivity lens and more importantly the legalistic lens of 
                                                 
10 The Mexican Family Life Survey (MXFLS) is publicly available under: www.ennvih-mxfls.org 
 
  7informality can be constructed with different measures.
11 Details of the questions 
analyzed are provided in the Annex 1.  
For the legalistic view of the labor market and the focus on which regulations apply this 
paper distinguishes several categories: 
(1) Social Security and No Social Security for the current main job provided by the IMSS 
(the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social). This information is also available for 
2003.  
(2) Written contract and no written contract for the current main job. This information is 
also available for 2003. 
(3) For the unemployed and the previous job history whether the person had social 
security or not and whether there was a written contract or not. 
(4) Temporary or permanent migration to the U.S. without the legal documentation. 
For the productivity view of the labor market this paper has employed the definitions 
often employed in the current literature on firm-size and self-employment and being a 
boss or employer.  
(5) For the productivity related view this paper looks at the self-employed and bosses in 
small firms with a size of 1 to 5 workers. 
 
4. Results  
This section discusses the descriptive tables for the various dimensions of informality 
(social security coverage, contractual coverage, self-employment in small firms and 
illegal migration) and the correlation between two legalistic types of informality, social 
security and contractual arrangements, for the current job and the previous job history. 
Also probit models are estimated to understand the significance of different individual 
and household characteristics in the propensity to be formal or informal. 
Table 1 compares the means for various characteristics for individuals, which report to 
have social security or not in their current main job. Looking at the means I find that the 
informal employees tend to be younger, female, unmarried, less educated and lower 
ability, which is measured by the score on the Raven’s test. The informal workers also 
have a higher share of participation in government programs and a history of informality 
in terms of social security, which is indicated by not having social security in 2003. In 
                                                 
11 Previous work on Mexico has included various dimensions, e.g. looking at social security coverage and 
health care coverage (Juarez 2009) or looking at the self-employed, formal and informal salaried (Bosch 
and Maloney 2007) 
  8terms of job history the currently unemployed, who answer questions on their last job, 
seems to have a similar shares of social security coverage or not.  
Comparing individuals, who have a written contract or only a verbal/non-written contract, 
Table 2 exhibits some similar behavior in terms of means. Individuals without written 
contracts are younger, less educated, with lower Raven’s test scores, lower income and 
have a history of previous informality in the contractual sense. 
Moving onto the productivity measure of informality the means show that individuals 
tend to be older, married, on average have lower scores on the Raven’s test, a job history 
of informality in terms of lack of social security and written contracts and have on 
average low incomes (with a large standard deviation tough) (Table 3).  
Illegal migrants to the U.S., who do not possess the legal documentation, are more likely 
to be males, in their 20s and 30s, with low income and previous history of informality on 
the legal dimensions of informality (Table 3).  
These results highlight the importance of the legal concept of informality of social 
security and contracts for workers, self-employed, illegal migrants and the unemployed. 
There seems to be hysteresis in the Mexican labor market. Informality in the legal 
dimension persists over time.
12
Correlating social security coverage and possession of a written contract for 2003 and 
2005, Table 4 illustrates that there is a significant correlation between these dimensions of 
formality at a point in time and over time. The significance is even at the 1 percent level.  
To understand the propensity to be formal, or reversely informal, Table 5 to Table 7 
present probit regressions and the marginal effects for the various informality measures. 
Gender, age, status in the household (household head), marital status, different education 
levels, region and industrial sector variables are included.  
As the Mexican dataset MXFLS includes a cognitive ability measure, Raven’s test, this 
paper uses the number of correct answers as an indication of ability and links it to 
informality and formality. De Mel et al. (2008, 2009) introduced these measures of ability 
in their studies of informality and self-employment. As can be seen from Figure 1, 
informal sector workers, workers without social security, and formal sector workers 
perform relatively similarly on this measure. Small differences at the lower and higher 
end of the distribution can be found for formal and informal workers. More informal 
                                                 
12 Various reasons for the persistence of informality, no social security coverage, are named in the literature. 
Individuals could be myopic towards their future or from a cost-benefit calculation might not value social 
security (Levy 2008; World Bank 2007). 
  9workers have no or a few correct answers and a smaller percentage of informal workers 
have higher numbers of correct answers when compared to formal workers. The score on 
this test is also included in the probit regressions as variable, which may determine 
selection into a particular job and thereby formality or informality.  
From Table 5 it is possible to see that older, married, higher educated individual have a 
higher propensity to be covered by social security. In addition to that also having a higher 
score in the Raven’s test increases the probability to be formal. When looking at gender 
differences, it is notable that for females secondary education and a higher ability 
measure make it more likely to be formal while for males age, marriage, education and 
ability make it more likely to be formal.  
For the other legalistic measure of informality, whether the individual has a written 
contract or not, age, secondary and tertiary education and the test score are significant and 
positive, for all and across gender (Table 6).  
Contrary to this, I find for the self-employed and bosses in small firms, older individuals 
are more likely to participate in this sector while being single makes it less likely. Higher 
education levels make it also more likely while the ability measure remains insignificant 
(Table 7). For illegal migrants the results do not exhibit significance for the education or 
ability measure. Being female and a household head make it less likely to have an 
incidence of illegal migration to the United States.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
As Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom (2006) emphasize, the role and distinction 
between formality and informality is far from clarified and a set of working policies for 
the formal and informal labor market are not known with certainty either. 
This note finds that the various legal measures of informality, whether the individual is 
covered by social security or has a written contract in the current job or in the previous 
job, are significantly correlated. An element of persistence of informality is present in the 
labor market. Moreover, age, martial status, education level and the score on the Raven’s 
test, a measure of ability, are significant determinants whether the individual has social 
security or not or has a written contract or not.  
For the self-employed in small firms age, education and being single are significant 
predictors of this category while the measure of ability is not. For illegal migrants, 
individuals who migrated temporary or permanently to the U.S. without legal 
documentation, being male and not a household head are significant determinants.   
  10The results of this paper demonstrate the need to investigate empirically the different 
forms of informality to inform the debate in the literature on whether the formal and 
informal labor market is segmented or integrated and the policy measures applicable to 
informality, which persists in the labor market over time.  
Further extensions to this paper could include a detailed analysis of the different concepts 
of informality and job mobility and wages to test the degree of segmentation and 
integration of formal and informal labor markets and the persistence of informality. 
Overall, this paper intends to highlight the various dimensions of informality, in the 
particular country case of Mexico. Applications, implementations and data collection on 
various dimensions of regulations and measures of informality for other developing and 
transitions countries could shed further light on the rather complex phenomenon of 
informality in the labor market. This would provide further empirical data to analyze 
policies and their impact, which at present time is an emerging literature limited due to 
data availability on informality in the labor market and the wider economy. This would 
help us to gain insights on what policies are needed to tackle or work with particular 
forms of informality in a given country.  
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  14Annex 1: Questions in MXFLS-2 
 
These questions are extracted from the survey documentation of the MXFLS-2, which are 
available under www.ennvih-mxfls.org. 
 
(1) Main job and dimensions of legality and informality: 
A question posed to individuals about the current main and secondary job allows covers 
the contractual situation, the legal status in terms of social security coverage, contractual 
relationship, health insurance and bonus payments: 
When you work as […], do you have (…)? (Circle All That Apply) 
1.  Written contract for an indefinite amount of time (basis, settled, trusting position, etc.) 
2.  Written contract for determined time or for a specific job 
3.  Verbal contract (does not have a written contract) 
4.  Social Security (IMSS) 
5.  ISSSTE, PEMEX, SEDENA or SECMAR 
6.  Private medical insurance given by the company/business 
7.  AFORE or SAR (savings system for retirement) 
8.  Christmas bonus 
9.  None of the above 
(2) Job history and dimensions of legality and informality: 
The above question was also asked to the unemployed about their previous jobs and also 
about job history information relating to job status in the year 2003.  
(3) Migration and dimensions of legality and informality:  
Permanent migrants, migrants who stayed one year or longer, are asked the following 
question: 
At the time you moved to […] did you have any legal documentation that allowed you 
entry into the USA? 
1.  Visa 
2.  Green card 
3.  American citizenship 
4.  Did not have legal documents 
5.  Other (specify) 
For temporary migrants, who stayed one to twelve months, an analogous question is 
posited: 
  15At the time of your trip to […] did you have any legal documentation that allowed you 
entry to the USA? 
1.  Visa 
2.  Green card 
3.  American citizenship 
4.  Did not have legal documents 
5.  Other (specify) 
(4) Informality and non-labor income from government programs 
To determine the link between informality in the labor market, measured on various 
dimensions, and the receipt of non-labor income from government programs, also 
questions relating to various programs will be employed.  
The following questions asked about the different programs, Oportunidades (before 
Progresa), Procampo, Vivah, work credit program, social coinvestment, Pet program and 
Alianza por el campo are analyzed:
13
Name of the program directly paid to you 
1. You are a participant, and you have received income 
2. You are a participant, but you have not received income 
3. Not a participant 
(5) Employment and dimensions of productivity unit and informality: 
Self-employment and comisionistas, who according to Levy (2008) are “working on 
their own or in a legal nonsalaried capacity with a firm” can also be determined in the 
dataset. In this paper I focused on the self-employed and employers/bosses in small firms 
(1-5).  
The self-employed in small firms can be found through the following two questions in the 
main job: 
(1) Then, when you work as […], are you (…)? 
1. Farmer on your own plot. 
2. Family worker in a household owned business, without wages 
3. Non-agricultural worker or employee 
4. Rural laborer, or land farmhand (agricultural worker) 
5. Boss, employer or business proprietor 
6. Self-employed worker (with or without monetary compensation) 
                                                 
13 The question on Oportunidades was asked according to the questionnaire but it seems the data are not 
available in the dataset at present.  
  167. Worker without monetary compensation from a business or company that is not owned 
by the household 
 (2) How many people, including yourself, worked during the past month at your work 
place (office, company, shop, business etc.) 
1. Number of people 
 
(6) Earnings  
To determine the earnings and the nature of earnings: 
How much did you earn last month, since (SAY THE PREVIOUS MONTH’S DATE) until 
today, for working as […]? Amounts in Dollar 
A.  Wage or salary (after taxes) 
B.  Payment per pieceworks 
C.  Commissions and tips 
D.  Extra hours 
E.  Meals 
F.  Housing 
G.  Transportation 
H.  Medical Benefits 
I.  Others (specify) 
  17Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Dimensions of Informality: Social Security 
 
Social Security No Social Security
Mean N Mean N
Age
below 15 0.23 4 1.5 60
15 to 25 26.85 476 29.61 1,184
25 to 35 31.47 558 25.54 1,021
35 to 45 22.90 406 22.31 892
45 to 55 13.48 239 13.61 544
55 to 65 3.78 67 5.7 228
above 65 1.30 23 1.73 69
Gender
Female 35.25 632 38.24 1,546
Male 64.75 1,161 61.76 2,497
Education
No education 1.62 29 4.03 163
Primary education 23.76 426 29.46 1,191
Secondary education 57.11 1,024 50.53 2,043
Tertiary education 16.06 288 14.1 570
Family Status
Married 51.87 930 45.58 1,843
Cohabiting 8.70 156 10.83 438
Single 30.90 554 34.88 1,410
Divorced/Separated/Widowed 8.09 145 8.24 333
Household head 46.46 833 41.9 1,694
Ability Measure
Number of correct answers 7.238 1215 6.928 2818
[2.702] [2.722]
Income  1/ 4959.5 1522 4193.1 3433
[5452.1] [5128.5]
Non-labor income 2/
Program participants 1.28 23 2.25 91
History of Informality 3/
No social security 13.51 178 94.1 2,454
No contract 12.38 137 38.7 661
Currently Unemployed 4/ 9.6 41 9.62 100
Total Observations 1,793 4,043
Source: Author's calculations based on MXFLS-2. 
Notes: 
Numbers in Percent and standard deviations in bracktets unless otherwise reported. 
Percent refers to each sample (column) as its own reference group. 
Social Security in main job. No social security in main job. For employees. 
1/ In Dollars, monthly income main job, average. 
2/ Oportunidades variable is not available in MXFLS-2 dataset at present. Participants in other programs are included. 
3/ In 2003.
4/ For the currently unemployed whether in the last job they had social security or not. 








  18Table 2: Dimensions of Informality: Contracts 
 
Contract No contract
Mean N Mean N
Age
below 15 0.36 10 2.01 26
15 to 25 24.28 674 34.72 450
25 to 35 30.22 839 24.23 314
35 to 45 25.36 704 19.68 255
45 to 55 14.23 395 11.88 154
55 to 65 4.43 123 5.4 70
above 65 1.12 31 2.08 27
Gender
Female 38.54 1,083 36.8 481
Male 61.46 1,727 63.2 826
Education
N o  e d u c a t i o n 1 . 3 53 84 . 5 96
Primary education 17.94 504 34.2 447
Secondary education 56.12 1,577 51.03 667




Married 52.03 1,462 39.94 522
Cohabiting 8.9 250 12.39 162
Single 31.03 872 39.48 516
Divorced/Separated/Widowed 7.51 211 7.96 104
Household head 44.88 1,261 40.78 533
Ability Measure
Number of correct answers 7.434 1878 6.684 935
[2.671] [2.735]
Income  1/ 5644.4 2372 3326.4 1120
[6358.2] [3584.3]
Non-labor income 2/
Program participants 1.32 37 2.52 33
History of Informality 3/
No social security 54.12 1,111 82.02 689
No contract 4.62 90 87.83 671
Currently Unemployed 4/ 9.17 52 8.61 39
Total Observations 2,810 1,307
Source: Author's calculations based on MXFLS-2. 
Notes: 
Numbers in Percent and standard deviations in bracktets unless otherwise reported. 
Percent refers to each sample (column) as its own reference group. 
Contract: written for main job, No contract: only verbal contract for main job. For employees.
1/ In Dollars, monthly income main job, average. 
2/ Oportunidades variable is not available in MXFLS-2 dataset at present. 
Participants in other programs are included. 
3/ In 2003.
4/ For the currently unemployed whether in the last job they had a contract or not. 








  19Table 3: Dimensions of Informality: Self-employment and Migration 
 
Self-employed Illegal  migrants 
Mean N Mean N
Age
below 15 0.27 5 0.99 1
15 to 25 11.11 202 25.74 26
25 to 35 18.64 339 38.61 39
35 to 45 26.17 476 20.79 21
45 to 55 22.26 405 7.92 8
55 to 65 13.25 241 3.96 4
above 65 8.3 151 1.98 2
Gender
Female 44.53 814 19.42 20
Male 55.47 1,014 80.58 83
Education
No education 9.96 182 4.85 5
Primary education 45.19 826 38.83 40
Secondary education 34.52 631 47.57 49
Tertiary education 9.35 171 2.91 3
Family Status
Married 60.94 1,114 55.34 57
Cohabiting 10.89 199 11.65 12
Single 16.25 297 28.16 29
Divorced/Separated/Widowed 11.87 217 4.85 5
Household head 53.23 973 38.83 40
Ability Measure
Number of correct answers 6.492 932 6.819 83
[2.836] [2.572]
Income  1/ 2285.9 1536 3846.1 39
[10378.5] [3242.8]
Non-labor income 2/
Program participants 2.35 43 5.83 6
History of Informality 3/
No social security 72.57 82 84.78 39
No contract 42.47 31 48.15 13
Total Observations 1,828 103
Source: Author's calculations based on MXFLS-2. 
Notes: 
Numbers in Percent and standard deviations in bracktets unless otherwise reported. 
Percent refers to each sample (column) as its own reference group. 
Self-employed/employers in small firms (1-5 employees) 
and migrants to the U.S. without legal documentation.
1/ In Dollars, monthly net income/profits, average. 
2/ Oportunidades variable is not available in MXFLS-2 dataset at present. 
Participants in other programs are included. 
3/ In 2003.








  20Table 4: Correlation Coefficients between different dimensions of formality in 2003 and 
2005 
social security 2005 contract 2005 social security 2003 contract 2003
social security 2005 1 … … …
contract 2005 0.3600* 1 … …
social security 2003 0.8096* 0.2613* 1 …
contract 2003 0.2853* 0.8331* 0.3557* 1
Source: Author's calculations based on MXFLS-2. 
Asterisks denotes significance at 1 percent level
Employees only. 




Table 5: Determinants of Informality (Legalistic measure, social security): Probit Models 
 
All Female Male
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
female -0.039 -0.013 … … … …
[0.060] [0.020] … … … …
age 0.006** 0.002** 0.004 0.001 0.008** 0.003**
[0.003] [0.001] [0.005] [0.002] [0.004] [0.001]
household head 0.043 0.014 -0.038 -0.012 0.088 0.029
[0.071] [0.023] [0.145] [0.045] [0.099] [0.033]
married 0.197** 0.065** 0.086 0.028 0.191* 0.063*
[0.095] [0.032] [0.174] [0.057] [0.116] [0.038]
single 0.129 0.042 -0.032 -0.01 0.201 0.067
[0.098] [0.032] [0.172] [0.055] [0.126] [0.043]
divorced/separated 0.16 0.054 0.148 0.049 0.09 0.03
[0.131] [0.046] [0.198] [0.067] [0.220] [0.076]
primary edu. 0.359** 0.123** 0.143 0.047 0.478** 0.165**
[0.158] [0.056] [0.249] [0.083] [0.211] [0.076]
secondary edu. 0.629*** 0.200*** 0.499** 0.155** 0.654*** 0.210***
[0.156] [0.048] [0.241] [0.073] [0.209] [0.065]
tertiary edu. 0.591*** 0.212*** 0.372 0.127 0.652*** 0.238***
[0.164] [0.063] [0.254] [0.091] [0.220] [0.085]
score in Raven's test 0.019* 0.006* 0.047*** 0.015*** -0.002 -0.001
[0.010] [0.003] [0.016] [0.005] [0.013] [0.004]
Observations 2934 2934 1154 1154 1780 1780
Source: Author's calculations based on MXFLS-2. 
Notes:
Dependent variable: 1 for formal and 0 for informal, employees, social security or not. 
Mean of dependent variable 0.31.
(1) Probit regression, (2) marginal effects.
State and Industrial sector controls included. Base Mexico City and Manufacturing.
No education and with unmarried partner, omitted categories. 
edu.: education
score in Raven's test: measure for ability








  21Table 6: Determinants of Informality (Legalistic measure, contract): Probit Models 
 
All Female Male
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
female -0.034 -0.012 … … … …
[0.071] [0.026] … … … …
age 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.021*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.006***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.006] [0.002] [0.005] [0.002]
household head 0.004 0.001 -0.106 -0.039 0.046 0.017
[0.086] [0.031] [0.171] [0.063] [0.119] [0.044]
married 0.227** 0.082** 0.287 0.099 0.176 0.065
[0.110] [0.039] [0.204] [0.068] [0.132] [0.049]
single -0.075 -0.027 -0.015 -0.005 -0.081 -0.03
[0.111] [0.041] [0.198] [0.071] [0.142] [0.053]
divorced/separated 0.024 0.009 0.253 0.086 -0.32 -0.124
[0.152] [0.055] [0.231] [0.074] [0.259] [0.103]
primary edu. 0.23 0.082 0.052 0.018 0.343 0.122*
[0.166] [0.057] [0.275] [0.097] [0.212] [0.072]
secondary edu. 0.805*** 0.294*** 0.806*** 0.290*** 0.797*** 0.292***
[0.161] [0.057] [0.265] [0.093] [0.208] [0.074]
tertiary edu. 1.100*** 0.324*** 1.216*** 0.343*** 0.999*** 0.303***
[0.174] [0.037] [0.283] [0.058] [0.225] [0.051]
score in Raven's test 0.051*** 0.019*** 0.060*** 0.021*** 0.040*** 0.015***
[0.012] [0.004] [0.019] [0.007] [0.015] [0.005]
Observations 2037 2037 818 818 1219 1219
Source: Author's calculations based on MXFLS-2. 
Notes:
Dependent variable: 1 for formal and 0 for informal, employees,written contract or not. 
Mean of dependent variable 0.68.
(1) Probit regression, (2) marginal effects.
State and Industrial sector controls included. Base Mexico City and Manufacturing.
No education and with unmarried partner, omitted categories. 
edu.: education
score in Raven's test: measure for ability




















  22Table 7: Determinants of Informality (productivity measure and migration): Probit Models 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
female 0.04 0.012 -1.013*** -0.010***
[0.069] [0.021] [0.249] [0.002]
age 0.018*** 0.005*** 0.001 0
[0.003] [0.001] [0.006] [0.000]
household head -0.068 -0.021 -0.611*** -0.007***
[0.074] [0.023] [0.160] [0.002]
married 0.12 0.037 0.269 0.003
[0.090] [0.028] [0.212] [0.003]
single -0.245** -0.073** -0.28 -0.003
[0.098] [0.029] [0.228] [0.003]
divorced/separated -0.031 -0.009 -0.169 -0.002
[0.130] [0.039] [0.442] [0.004]
primary edu. 0.226** 0.070** 0.06 0.001
[0.110] [0.035] [0.243] [0.003]
secondary edu. 0.425*** 0.132*** -0.11 -0.001
[0.117] [0.036] [0.256] [0.003]
tertiary edu. 0.556*** 0.194*** -0.322 -0.003
[0.138] [0.052] [0.344] [0.002]
score in Raven's test -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0
[0.010] [0.003] [0.023] [0.000]
Observations 2858 2858 5005 5005
Source: Author's calculations based on MXFLS-2. 
Notes:
Dependent variable (productivity measure): 
1 Self-employed/bosses in small firms 0 for other employed in small firms. 
Mean of dependent variable: For productivity measure 0.31
Dependent variable (migration): 1 illegal migrant (temporary or permanent) 0 other employed.
Mean of dependent variable: For migration 0.01
(1) Probit regression, (2) marginal effects.
State and Industrial sector controls included. Base Mexico City and Manufacturing.
No education and with unmarried partner, omitted categories. 
edu.: education
score in Raven's test: measure for ability
Productivity Measure Migration
















  23Figure 1: Ability and Informality (Legalistic Measure) 
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